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THEFT AND RURAL POVERTY: RESULTS OF A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
Marcel Fafchamps (Oxford University) and Bart Minten (Cornell University) 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between theft and poverty in rural areas. Following a 
disputed presidential election, fuel supply to the highlands of Madagascar was severely curtailed in 
early 2002, resulting in a massive -- if temporary -- increase in poverty. This situation constituted a 
natural experiment of the effect of poverty on theft. Using original survey data collected in June 
2002 at the height of the crisis, we find that crop theft increases with poverty and that an increase in 
law enforcement personnel reduces cattle theft, a form of organized crime. Results suggest that 
theft is used by some of the rural poor as a risk coping strategy. Increased transport costs led to a 
rise in cattle and crop theft, suggesting that isolation raises crime. 
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There has long been a suspicion that poverty favors criminal activity, but hard evidence of this 
relationship is difficult to come by. There are several reasons for this state of affairs, all having to 
do with the joint causality between poverty and crime. First, the prevalence of crime in an area 
discourages business, hence contributing to poverty. Secondly, high crime areas may also attract 
criminals because they find it easier to elude detection or because these areas constitute focal points 
for customers -- think of prostitution or of the drug trade, for instance. Finally, individuals with a 
high predisposition for crime are likely to have unobservable traits (e.g., lack of discipline) that 
make them less employable and thus would make them poorer even if they did not resort to crime. 
For all these reasons, analyses of the relationship between crime and poverty are often regarded 
with skepticism (Bourguignon 2000, Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza, 2001). 
Efforts to bypass these problems have focused on natural experiments such as income transfers 
(Imrohoroglu, Merlo & Rupert 2000, Rephann 1999). At this juncture, the conclusion from the 
empirical literature is that poverty has little effect on crime (Dreze & Reetika 2000, Krueger & 
Pischke 1997, Doyle, Ahmed & Horn 1999, Morgan 2000, Blau & Blau 1999, Jarrell & Howsen 
1990, Freeman 1996). The available evidence, however, is largely if not exclusively based on data 
from rich countries -- predominantly the U.S. -- where most crime is related to the drug trade. We 
know very little about how poverty affects crime in poorer countries, in spite of the fact that crime 
represents a major welfare issue. In a rare intercountry comparison, Fajnzylber, Lederman and   3 
Loayza (1998) show that many developing countries have crime rates equal to or higher than that of 
developed countries. 
This paper revisits this issue by taking advantage of a natural experiment in Madagascar. Following 
a disputed presidential election, fuel supply to the central highlands of the country was severely 
curtailed in early 2002, resulting in a massive -- if temporary -- increase in poverty. This situation, 
however dramatic it was for the population, enables us to ascertain the immediate effect of poverty 
on crime. Using data on crime and poverty before and during the crisis in a number of locations or 
“communes”, we examine whether l ocations where poverty increased more also experienced a 
higher increase in crime. The originality of this approach is that it controls for many of the factors 
that plague cross-section or panel analysis, since the shock was too swift to enable reverse 
causation to manifest itself. Moreover, because fuel prices skyrocketed, there was no massive 
relocation of population over the time period considered. The large magnitude and unpredictable 
nature of the shock also are advantages relative to studies that focus on increments in transfers.  
This work fits within a growing economic literature on crime and conflicts. While economic 
analysis of criminal activity in developed countries is well developed (Becker 1968, Morgan 2000, 
Krueger & Pischke 2000, Imrohoroglu, Merlo & Rupert 2000, Doyle, Ahmed & Horn 1999), 
research elsewhere in the world is still in its infancy. There is a growing recognition among 
development economists that crime and conflicts take a heavy toll on the welfare of the poor 
(Bourguignon 2000, Stewart et al. 1997).  
In Madagascar, Fafchamps and Moser (2002) find that crime is higher in isolated, less populated 
areas, not in urban areas as is common in rich countries. This suggests that the geographical pattern 
of crime in poor countries might be quite different from that in rich countries. Programme Ilo 
provides evidence that security is one of the major concerns among the Malagasy people. In 2001,   4 
security conditions in the country were perceived to be bad or very bad by   two thirds of  rural 
households. When asked whether security is important to improve living conditions, 83% of the 
country's rural households stated that security was important or very important. Security in general 
and crime in particular thus were at the top of citizens' concerns, even before the political crisis that 
would unfold in the first half of 2002. 
The paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework is introduced briefly in Section 2. 




As starting point for our investigation, we begin by positing a relationship between crime, 
population, and law enforcement. Let Cit denote crime in location i at time t and let Pit be total 
population. Similarly, let Dit, Rit, and Lit denote the number of poor, non-poor, and law enforcement 
personnel in location i at time t. By construction, Pit=Dit+Rit. We posit the relationship:  




where l(i) is a location-specific effect capturing all time-invariant determinants of crime and s(t) is 
a common time effect. The parameters we are interested in are a, s, and g.  
Equation (1) essentially says that expected crime is an increasing function of population and a 
decreasing function of law enforcement. We expect a to be positive and close to 1, i.e., we expect 
crime to be roughly proportional to population. If law enforcement is effective at deterring crime, s 
should be significantly positive. Parameter g captures the effect of poverty on crime: if the poor and 
non-poor have the same crime rate, then g should be unity. In contrast, if crime is more prevalent 
among the poor, we expect g to be larger than one.   5 
To facilitate estimation, equation (1) can be transformed into:  




which, after taking logs, is approximately equal to:  
(3)     log E[Cit] ( ( log Pit + (((-1)Dit/Pit - ( logLit + ((i) + ((t) 
Testing whether poverty affects crime boils down to testing whether g „ 1 and thus whether the 
coefficient of Dit/Pit„0. 
Equation (3) is estimated in Section 4. Two estimation methods are used. The first adds zero-mean 
errors to equation (3) and estimates it using standard fixed and random effect estimators to 
eliminate l(i). The second regards the number of crime incidents Cit as following a Poisson process 
with mean given by:  
(4)     E[Cit]= e (a log Pit + a(g-1)Dit/Pit - t logLit + l(i) + s(t))  
Equation (4) is estimated using a conditional fixed and random effect Poisson regressions to 
eliminate l(i). We expect different types of criminal activity to respond differently to changes in 
poverty. Certain categories of crime can be seen as a desperate response to poverty, as when 
someone steals food to feed himself and his family. We expect these types of crime to rise when 
poverty increases. Other criminal activities may take place within well organized networks and 
other mafias that restrict entry in crime. Because the poor cannot enter these activities easily, they 
are largely insulated from poverty shocks. 
In Madagascar, cattle theft is a serious endemic problem that plagues specific parts of the country 
and is facilitated by geographical isolation (Fafchamps and Moser, 2002). According to 
Rasamoelina (2000) and Razafitsiamidy (1997, cattle thieves are well organized groups that often 
operate with the complicity of local authorities. Because this form of organization is likely to 
restrict entry, we expect cattle theft to be relatively insulated from poverty shocks. However, as   6 
commune residents are hit by a major shock, they may sell (part of) their livestock to smooth 
consumption (Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998). So doing, they also reduce their exposure to 
cattle raiders. If cattle sales are sufficiently large, this may r educe cattle theft as there is less 
livestock to steal. 
In contrast, crop theft is expected to increase with poverty as people turn to crime to mitigate the 
effect of the shock on their lives. What remains unclear is whether these forms of crime respond 
more to an increase in deep poverty -- e.g., chronic lack of food  -- or whether it is the moderately 
poor who temporarily turn to crime as a consumption smoothing strategy. Some empirical evidence 




We estimate the model using data collected in rural Madagascar. What makes these data unique is 
the very unusual set of circumstances under which they were gathered. In December 2001, the first 
round of a presidential election witnessed the success of the former mayor of the capital city over 
the incumbent and long-time president of the country. Two independent vote counts gave the 
challenger an absolute majority and declared him the winner. But the official ballot count gave the 
challenger less than 50% of the votes and called for a second round. Suspecting that official results 
had been rigged, the challenger disputed the official ballot count. 
What followed were six months of rampant conflict between the two candidates. The challenger 
reinforced his control over the capital while the incumbent retreated to Toamasina, the major port 
city. Rallying under his banner the governors of most provinces except the central highlands, the 
incumbent then proceeded to blast key road bridges and to blockade the capital city and its   7 
hinterland. The immediate consequence was a sixfold increase of gasoline prices in the highlands 
and a doubling of transport costs. The ensuing disruption of the economy raised havoc among 
farmers who could no longer sell their surplus to the market, as well as among urban dwellers who 
faced sharp increases in food prices. As a result, the country experienced a dramatic  -- but 
hopefully temporary  -- increase in rural poverty. Fortunately, the political conflict did not 
degenerate into an all-out civil war. By the Summer most of the army had rallied the challenger's 
cause and the incumbent president fled the country in late June. On June 26, the US government 
recognized the new government. Three days later, France followed suit. The crisis was over. 
The data used here were collected during the month of June 2002, just before roadblocks were 
lifted between the major port city of Toamasina and the rest of the country. The survey focuses on 
three of the worst affected regions of the country  -- the two provinces of Antananarivo and 
Fianarantsoa located in the central highlands where the majority of the population lives, and the 
coastal province of Mahajanga which depends on the highlands for supply of consumer goods and 
outlet for its agricultural surplus. A stratified sampling frame was set up in such a way to be as 
representative as possible of the situation in these three provinces. Districts (fivondronanas) were 
divided into six strata depending on the distance to the provincial capital and on the availability of a 
tarred road. In each strata, one district or fivondronana was selected for every province. In each 
district, four communes were then selected at random, resulting in a total sample of 72 communes. 
The small size of the sample is primarily driven by the heroic conditions under which the survey 
was undertaken, i.e., in the midst of a serious and volatile political crisis that made vehicle transport 
difficult and movements of enumerators costly and dangerous.
1  
                                                 
1 Data collection was undertaken by the USAID-funded Ilo project in collaboration with INSTAT 
and FOFIFA. INSTAT is the statistical institute of the Ministry of Economy and Planning. FOFIFA 
is a the agricultural research institute within the Ministry of Scientific Research. This project has a   8 
Via interviews with key informants and focus groups  -- typically local administrators, public 
servants, traders, and farmers -- the survey collected detailed information on crime incidence in the 
April-May 2002 period immediately preceding the survey, as well as on the April-May 2001. Given 
the high seasonality in  incidences in crime (Razafitsiamidy 1997)  and in poverty (Minten and 
Zeller 2000), data were gathered for comparable periods during the year. Respondents were also 
asked to evaluate the proportion of the population experiencing difficulties feeding themselves 
during the same period, as well as the number of law enforcement personnel operating in the 
commune. 
Answers are summarized in Table 1, together with t-tests for the difference between 2001 and the 
corresponding period in 2002. We see that cattle theft remained constant over time while crop theft 
went up -- but the t-statistic is not significant. We report two distinct poverty lines: the percentage 
of commune residents who face difficulties feeding themselves throughout the year, and the 
percentage of those who face occasional difficulties feeding themselves. We call the first the 
chronically food insecure and the second the temporarily food insecure. By construction, the 
second category includes the first. Table 1 shows t hat both measures of poverty went up 
significantly with the crisis. The magnitude of the effect is quite large, especially on temporary 
poverty. The bottom of Table 1 also reports changes in law enforcement personnel between 2001 
and 2002. The figures show no change over time, albeit there are changes within communes 
between the two years. Table 1 further shows that transport costs doubled between 2001 and 2002. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
long experience collecting data in Madagascar and had just completed a census of all communes in 
the country before the December elections. The census could thus be used as sampling frame for 
the survey discussed here.   9 
Empirical results 
 
We are now ready to turn to our estimates of equation (3). To avoid losing zero observations, we 
add one to the dependent variable and to the number of law enforcement personnel before taking 
logs. Regressions include the two measures of poverty reported in Table 1. Since, by construction, 
the chronically insecure are included in the temporary insecure, the coefficient on the temporarily 
food insecure should be interpreted as the effect of poverty in general, while the coefficient of the 
chronically food insecure measures the additional effect of severe poverty. A 2002 year dummy is 
included to control for the possible presence of a common shock, e.g., lawlessness induced by the 
deleterious political climate. 
Table 2 reports first OLS regression estimates using commune fixed-effect and random effect 
estimators. A Hausman test is also provided to compare the fixed and random effect results. Except 
in the case of cattle rustling, we fail to reject the random effect model. Results show that an 
increase in poverty is associated with a rise in crop theft but has no significant effect on cattle theft. 
These results are in agreement with expectations: theft increases with poverty while organized 
crime (cattle theft) are insensitive to changes in poverty.  Results indicate that it is our broad 
definition of poverty that is associated with crop theft, not the number of chronically poor. Crime 
therefore appears as a consumption smoothing strategy by the not-so-poor as they seek to protect 
their standards of living. The 2002 dummy is not significant in any of the regressions, indicating 
that lawlessness did not systematically increase over and above the effect of poverty and law 
enforcement. 
In contrast, changes in law enforcement personnel are associated with a drop in cases of cattle theft. 
The effect is only significant in the fixed-effect regression, but this is our preferred regression since   10 
the Hausman test rejects the random effect model. This result suggests that prevention and 
deterrence is highest for organized crime. It is also conceivable that cattle thieves, who operate over 
a large territory, simply shift their operations to other communes in response to movements in law 
enforcement personnel. This issue deserves more investigation. 
Because crime remains a rare event, ordinary least squares is not the most efficient estimator. 
Assuming that crime follows a Poisson distribution with incidence rate given by equation (4), this 
specification probably provides a more accurate representation of the data generation process and is 
thus likely to be more efficient. This is true for the Poisson random effect model. Once we control 
for commune fixed effects, however, this need no longer be the case. The reason is that, like the 
fixed-effect logit estimator, the fixed-effect Poisson estimator is a conditional estimator, meaning 
that all observations in which the dependent variable is unchanged are not used for estimation 
purposes. Throwing away observations reduces efficiency. 
Table 2 further reports estimates of the model using a fixed-effect (conditional) Poisson estimator 
as well as a random effect Poisson estimator. Unlike in the case of standard fixed and random effect 
models, we cannot use a Hausman test to compare the two Poisson models. This is because the 
fixed effect Poisson estimator is conditional, that is, uses only observations for which the dependent 
variable changes over time. As for OLS, we find that temporary poverty has a significant positive 
effect on crop theft and that law enforcement has a significant negative effect on cattle theft. 
Chronic poverty has a positive effect on cattle theft. One possible explanation is that commune 
residents sold livestock to deal with a temporary shock, hence reducing the number of animals that 
could be stolen. At the same time, chronically poor households may have turned to cattle theft out 
of desperation.   11 
Unlike in the OLS fixed and random regressions, Poisson regressions suggest that isolation  – 
measured by transport costs to the nearest major town – has a positive effect on rural theft. This is 
particularly strong in the fixed-effect regression.  This is consistent with the results reported by 
Fafchamps and Moser (2002) who show that crime in rural Madagascar increases when roads are 




In this paper we use data from a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between theft and 
poverty in rural Madagascar. This paper is one of very few efforts to understand criminal activity in 
poor countries. What makes the investigation unique is the timing of data collection: right in the 
middle of a serious and volatile political crisis that led to a blockade of the heartland of the country. 
Disruption to road transport and agricultural production was massive and it resulted in a dramatic -- 
if only temporary  -- increase in poverty. Because the political crisis was resolved with little 
bloodshed, there was no refugee crisis and the damage is nearly exclusively economical. This 
unusual sequence of events thus provides us with a unique way of assessing the effect of poverty on 
theft while keeping other theft determinants unchanged. The large magnitude of the shock 
compensates for the small size of the sample. 
Fixed-effect regressions are estimated for a least squares and a Poisson model. Two alternative sets 
of poverty measures are used. Results suggest that crime increases with poverty. Our most 
conclusive results are for crop theft where poverty is shown to have a significant effect with both 
poverty measures in Poisson regressions and in the standard fixed and random effect models with 
food insecurity as measure of poverty. Contrary to expectations, it is not chronic poverty that has   12 
the strongest effect on crime, but temporary poverty. This suggests that some households use crop 
theft as a consumption smoothing device. We also find that an increase in law enforcement 
personnel reduces cattle theft, possibly because thieves move their activities elsewhere. Finally, the 
Poisson regression results suggest that poverty may reduce cattle theft as households liquidate 
livestock to generate much needed funds. 
Results presented here provide evidence that crop theft is used by some of the rural poor as a risk 
coping strategy. Because criminal activity is often local in nature, other people affected by similar 
shocks bear the brunt of crime. For this reason, we expect the poor to bear much of the welfare cost 
of crime and of the associated  distortions and waste of resources in crime avoidance. The 
relationship between poverty and crime is thus likely to be important, especially in more isolated 
rural areas (Fafchamps and Moser, 2002). This issue deserves more research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics             
                       
Item  Unit  April/May 2001  April/May 2002  Paired t test 
      Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-value  P>t 
Incidences of crime             
Zebu theft  Number per month per commune  27.03  1.50  33.90  0.50  -0.458  0.647 
Crop theft  Number per month per commune  1.85  0.00  2.65  1.00  -1.146  0.254 
Measures of poverty             
Poor  % of population that face temporary problems to find enough to eat  44.12  40.00  58.25  70.00  -2.735  0.007 
Extreme 
poor  % of population that face chronic problems to find enough to eat  11.69  5.00  15.90  10.00  -1.603  0.111 
Law enforcement personnel             
  Number per commune  54.04  44.00  54.34  43.00  -0.041  0.967 
Transport costs              
Transport costs of a person one way to a major city (Fmg)  26687  20000  52979  37500  -3.991  0.000 
Transport costs of a bag of 50 kg one way to a major city (Fmg)  8973  6750  16778  13750  -4.735  0.000 
Number of communes in the survey=72             
   1 
 
Table 2: Determinants of theft                   
    Dependent variable (log (Number of incidences per month per commune+1)) 
    OLS  Poisson regression 
Determinants  Unit  Zebu theft  Crop theft  Zebu theft  Crop theft 
      Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  z-value  Coefficient  z-value 
Fixed effect model                   
law enforcement personnel  log+1  -3.812  -2.320  -1.033  -1.150  -5.440  -9.260  -2.055  -1.320 
poor (temporary food problems)  % of pop.  -0.001  -0.090  0.013  3.200  -0.004  -1.490  0.018  3.660 
extreme poor (chronic food problems)  % of pop.  0.006  0.360  -0.005  -0.520  0.022  2.090  0.012  0.700 
transport costs to major city  log(Fmg)  -0.070  -0.180  0.429  2.000  1.080  6.220  1.668  3.500 
time dummy  2002=1  0.173  0.480  -0.305  -1.550  -0.294  -1.850  -1.369  -3.000 
intercept    16.240  2.230  -0.147  -0.040         
sigma_u    3.856    1.385           
sigma_e    0.818    0.449           
rho    0.957    0.905           
number of observations    142    142    92    78   
Joint test if 2 poverty categories diff. from 0                   
F(2,66)    0.06    5.17    5.71    14.26   
Prob>F     0.94     0.01     0.06     0.00    
Random effect model                   
law enforcement personnel  log+1  0.430  1.740  0.091  0.770  -3.340  -5.470  0.213  0.710 
poor (temporary food problems)  % of pop.  0.003  0.570  0.010  3.530  -0.005  -1.860  0.010  2.700 
extreme poor (chronic food problems)  % of pop.  -0.003  -0.270  -0.009  -1.520  0.041  3.880  -0.005  -0.400 
transport costs to major city  log(Fmg)  0.227  1.450  0.034  0.450  1.141  7.170  0.278  1.530 
time dummy  2002=1  -0.124  -0.630  0.031  0.310  -0.483  -3.350  -0.065  -0.310 
intercept    -2.392  -1.250  -0.343  -0.370  7.189  2.060  -3.190  -1.380 
sigma_u    1.521    0.721           
sigma_e    0.818    0.449           
rho    0.776    0.721           
number of observations    142    142    142    142   
Joint test if 2 poverty categories diff. from 0                   
F(2,67)    0.33    12.48    16.27    7.31   
Prob>F    0.85    0.00    0.00    0.03   
Hausman test                   
Chi2(5)    13.06    6.65           
Prob>chi2     0.02     0.25                  2 
 